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(abstract for a refereed conference paper) 
 
 
BEHAVIOURS OF PROPERTY INVESTORS: AN INVESTIGATION ON THE RISK 
PERCEPTIONS OF AUSTRALIAN PROPERTY FUND MANAGERS 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Recent finance and real estate empirical and analytical studies have demonstrated that 
downside risk appears as an intuitively appealing risk measure in which it is more consistent 
with investors’ behaviours. Conversely, qualitative studies into the behaviours of investors, 
particularly real estate investors, have been relatively limited. This study seeks to address 
this shortfall and aims to examine the behaviours of property fund managers towards 
downside risk. A survey was conducted in order to investigate the risk perceptions of property 
fund managers and determine whether they only require compensation for bearing with 
higher downside risk. The acceptance level of downside risk in the property funds industry in 
Australia is also examined. The findings reveal that downside risk is more consistent with 
how investors individually perceive risk. However, there is also a gap between theoretical 
assertions and practice in which downside risk is not commonly used in the practice. The 
results give an insight into the knowledge base of property investors towards downside risk. 
 
 
Keywords: Australian property funds, downside risk, investors’ behaviours, property 
investors and risk perceptions. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
A number of recent studies have offered some analytical and empirical evidence to 
support the use of downside risk. In this context, downside risk is a risk measure that 
decomposes the variability of return into the upside and downside parts. Importantly, 
it is a risk measure that only focuses on downside part. The concept of ‘downside 
risk’ was first discussed in the early 1950s with the introduction of the concept of the 
safety first rule by Roy (1952). The safety first rule argues that investors would prefer 
an investment with the smallest probability of falling below a disaster level. Harlow 
(1991) also highlighted that downside risk is an appropriate description of investment 
risk because investors are usually more concerned about losses relative to a threshold 
return level. Markowitz (1959), commonly referred to as the ‘father of Modern 
Portfolio Theory’, also recognised the importance of this argument. As a result he 
suggested the use of semi-variance for measuring the downside risk of an investment.  
 
However, the concept of downside risk was only introduced into the real estate 
context by Sing and Ong (2000) and Sivitanides (1998) in the late 1990s. Sivitanides 
(1998) has examined the implications of downside risk to real estate portfolio 
construction where the results showed that the standard deviation overstated the risk 
for investors. Sing and Ong (2000) found similar results in which the downside risks 
(CLPM and SLPM) have lower deviations than variances. Importantly, Cheng (2001) 
and Coleman and Mansour (2005) have offered evidence of the downside allocation 
model appears to be a more rational model for real estate allocation. The rationales of 
using downside risk are that neither normal return distribution assumption nor a 
quadratic utility function assumption is required (Estrada, 2002, Nawrocki, 1999, 
Sing and Ong, 2000). The normal distribution assumption has been rejected by 
extensive studies such as Myer and Webb (1993, 1994). Bond and Patel (2003) also 
suggested using downside risk (semi-standard deviation) as the risk measure if the 
returns are found to be skewed. 
 
Extensive utility studies have also shown that the quadratic utility function 
assumption for traditional variance risk measure undermines the utility function’s 
ability to describe the actual behaviour of investors (Arrow, 1971, Pratt, 1964, 
Wippern, 1971). The introduction of prospect theory and disappointment aversion 
(DA) theory in utility literature by Gul (1991) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
further improved the utility theories in describing investor’s behavioural. The theories 
posit that the impacts of losses are greater for investors or agents in comparison to 
gains. Importantly, these theories imply that downside risk is more consistent with 
investors’ behaviour particularly for investors who are averse to downside losses. 
More specifically, downside risk measure clearly indicates that investors view upside 
gains and downside losses in a different manner, however, investors generally are 
more concerned about the downside variability of their investments than the upside 
gains; upside variability is also argued as upside potential and not the risk for 
investors. These features have made downside risk appears to be a more efficient risk 
measure as it is consistent with investor behaviour.  
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Several researchers have also extended the downside risk measure into an asset 
pricing model and proposed the Lower Partial Moment-CAPM (LPM-CAPM) (Bawa 
and Linderberg, 1977, Harlow and Rao, 1989, Hogan and Warren, 1974). They 
argued that downside beta is a preferred market-related risk measure in comparison to 
traditional beta. Galagedera (2007), Nantell et al. (1982) and Price et al. (1982) have 
also provided further evidence for the importance of examining downside beta. They 
confirmed that downside beta is empirically different from traditional beta if the 
return distributions are asymmetrically distributed. Moreover, in the real estate 
context, Lee et al. (2007b) demonstrated that the determinants for beta and downside 
beta in Australian LPTs are dissimilar. 
 
More recently, Ang et al. (2006) and Post and Vilet (2004) in finance literature and 
Cheng (2005) and Lee et al. (2007a) in real estate literature have confirmed that 
downside beta is a more favourable risk measure than traditional beta in asset pricing. 
Indeed the results exhibited that downside beta has strong exploratory power in 
explaining return variations; however there is no similar evidence for upside beta and 
beta. This indicates that downside beta is the only risk that is priced by investors. 
Nevertheless, this has also raised the issue of “why is only downside beta priced?” A 
possible explanation is that investors only require compensation for downside risk, 
whilst they do not necessarily require a risk premium for upside potential. This 
statement is consistent with the findings from the survey of US business executives 
(Mao, 1970) and confirms that downside risk is an efficient risk measure. The reason 
of its recognition is that it is consistent with how investors individually perceive risk. 
Nevertheless, relatively few surveys or qualitative studies has been involved with 
property investors.  
 
More importantly, the acceptance of the theoretical assertions in industry is 
questionable. A survey of Australian property securities fund managers revealed that 
most of the fund managers rated that downside risk is a less important risk measure 
(Tan, 2004). This finding is consistent with the argument of Brown and Matysiak 
(2000), where the main disadvantage for using downside risk at present is that the 
analysis is not well understood. Sing and Ong (2000) have also argued that the 
unfamiliarity and complexity of downside risk computation could be the factors that 
hampering practitioners’ acceptance towards downside risk.  Evans (2004) has also 
revealed that the standard deviation is the most popular risk measure for investors 
which is consistent with the findings from Mao (1970). The study depicted that 
variance is generally accepted and used as risk measure in capital budgeting theory, 
even though the respondents only concerned with downside losses. In portfolio 
management, Louargand (1992) and Worzala et al. (2000) also provided evidence 
that theoretical assertions from portfolio analysis are not necessarily followed by 
practitioners. Clearly, there is a conflict between theory and practice. 
 
Moreover, Evans (2004) exhibited that there is no relationship between risk tolerance 
level and expected returns from a survey, although this contradicts with the 
fundamental investment rule that ‘higher risk equates to higher return’. Similarly, the 
findings of Worzala et al. (2000) also indicated that property investors do not believe 
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that higher inherent risk for a particular asset can be justified by the higher return. 
French (2001) also argued that the assertions from normative models are rarely 
employed in the practice.  
 
It should be noted that not all of the theoretical assertions will be rejected by 
practitioners. Worzala and Newell (1997) compared the results from two surveys with 
European investors (Worzala, 1994) and Asian investors (Newell and Worzala, 1995) 
and found that European and Asian investors recognised the importance of 
international real estate investment in enhancing portfolio diversification. This is 
consistent with the assertions from previous empirical studies, which the 
diversification benefits for international real estate have been highlighted in real 
estate literature (Worzala and Sirmans, 2003, a review).  
 
Overall, extensive theoretical evidence has revealed that downside risk is more 
consistent with investor behaviour. Conversely, there is a gap between theoretical 
assertions and practice. In other words, the theoretical assertions from empirical and 
analytical studies for downside risk might not necessarily be accepted by 
practitioners. However, no study has been undertaken on the risk perceptions of 
property investors and their support of downside risk. Consequently, this study seeks 
to address this gap by examining the perceptions of property fund managers in 
Australia towards risk and their perception of downside risk.  
 
The contributions of this study are twofold. Firstly, this study attempts to contribute a 
greater understanding of the investors’ behaviours by conducting a survey about how 
individual investors actually perceive risks. This attempt is unique as many previous 
real estate studies have focused specifically on empirical approaches, while little has 
been placed on qualitative analysis. More importantly, previous studies have 
confirmed that the empirical and analytical assertions are not necessarily 
automatically be accepted by practitioners. Secondly, the survey is also one of the 
first attempts to comprehensively examine the acceptance level of practitioners for 
the concept of downside risk, as well as to identify the factors that hinder their 
acceptance of downside risk.  
 
The balance of this paper is organised as follows. Next is a review of the significance 
of Australian property funds industry, followed by a discussion on data collection and 
analysis. Thereafter, results and discussion are presented and discussed with the 
conclusion following.  
 
 
2.0 SIGNIFICANCE OF AUSTRALIAN PROPERTY FUNDS INDUSTRY 
 
Australia is one of the most securitised real estate markets in the world where 
Australian property funds industry plays a significant role in the Australian property 
market. As at 3 January 2005, Australian listed property market was the second 
largest securities market in the world with total market capitalisation of US$63.3 
billion (PREI, 2005). In December 2006, more than 60% of the commercial invested 
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real estate in Australia and New Zealand are in a securitised form. On the other hand, 
the importance securitised real estate market in US and European countries were 
substantial lower than in Australia, where in comparison there was a contribution of 
less than 10% of their total commercial invested real estate market (RREEF, 2007).   
 
Listed Property Trust (LPT) is the most popular structure among Australian investors 
to involve in property fund investments. In 2006, approximately AUD$143 billion 
total assets were managed by LPTs (PIR, 2006). As at 31 March 2007, the total 
market capitalisation of LPTs was approximately AUD$137 billion, representing 
around 10% of the total Australian share market. In addition, LPTs appeared as one of 
the largest sub-sectors on ASX  (ASX, 2007a, 2007b). Most importantly, table 1 
reveals that LPTs had been one the strongest performing sectors over the past 10 
years with the highest average return in comparison with other assets (e.g. share, 
direct property and bonds).   
 
 
(Insert Table 1) 
 
 
In fact, LPTs are the only one type of indirect property vehicles in Australian 
property funds industry. Almost half of the property funds (49%) consist of unlisted 
property trusts, wholesale funds, property syndicates and property securities funds. It 
should be noted that in 2006, all of these property funds owned over 5,600 
institutional-graded commercial properties in Australia and overseas with total assets 
of approximately AUD$275 billion with over 1.2 million investors (PIR, 2006). More 
importantly, in March 2007 almost 60% of the total assets of Australian institutional-
graded commercial property assets were owned by Australian property funds (ABS, 
2007). In respect to the importance of Australian property funds industry in the 
Australian commercial property market, it is essential to understand the risk 
perceptions of Australian property fund managers and importantly how they perceive 
risk.  
 
 
3.0 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The aim of this study is to examine the risk perceptions of property fund managers 
towards downside risk, and to achieve this, a questionnaire was designed in order to 
obtain the property fund managers views and opinions about risk. A closed question 
style was designed and most questions were structured using the likert scaling 
technique.  
 
The information for each property fund was mainly identified via Australian Property 
Funds Industry Survey 2006 report, which was published by Property Investment 
Research (PIR). A total 233 property funds were identified from both the report and 
the ASX website (www.asx.com.au). Note that the mortgages property funds (60 
funds) were excluded from this survey in line with the difference investment 
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characteristics and nature of this type of business.1 Moreover, there were 35 property 
funds without complete information due to several difficulties such as the funds were 
recently privatised, incomplete corresponding mailing and/or email addresses for the 
funds, no information on the contact person who should be contacted and so on. In 
turn this resulted in a total of 138 samples with complete corresponding information 
being used in this analysis. In order to verify the reliability of the questionnaire, a 
pilot test with small number of funds was conducted. This was followed by minor 
changes before the full questionnaire was distributed.  
 
The questionnaire is categorised into three parts. The first part of the questionnaire 
focuses on both the profile of the respondents as well as the respondents’ 
organisations, where the organisation’s background and risk management practice are 
identified. The second part of the questionnaire emphasises the respondents’ risk 
perceptions as well as their understanding on the concept of downside risk. The final 
part of the questionnaire focuses on employing downside risk in their organisations. 
The key motivations of employing downside risk, as well as the hurdles that hinder 
the use of downside risk among property fund managers, are also investigated. The 
survey was conducted during May-June 2007 and the questionnaires were distributed 
to the property fund managers that based throughout Australia via mail or email. To 
enrich the insights of this study, 6 respondents were also invited to participate with 
the personal interviews2. The interviews were face-to-face structured interviews and 
each interview lasted approximately one hour.  
 
Most questionnaires were sent to the respondents who are at the level of “Managing 
Director” or “General Manager” or “Fund Manager”. This approach was designed to 
benefit the study by ensuring a high level of reliability. In addition, the respondents 
have daily exposure to the fund’s management, decision-making process, portfolio 
management, performance measurement as well as risk management. Accordingly 
they were the most suitable person for responding the questionnaires. Their responses 
were then sorted and analysed using frequency analysis and cross-tabulation analysis. 
As required by University of Melbourne Human Ethics Office, the identity of the 
respondents will not be disclosed in this study. 
 
 
4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
4.1 Profile of Australian Property Funds 
 
This section provides an overview of the profile of respondents and their 
organisation. An invitation letter and questionnaire were sent simultaneously to the 
                                                 
1 A pilot study with the mortgages property funds indicated that most of the mortgages property fund 
managers did not view their funds as property funds. Also they did not think most of the 
issues/questions are applicable for their funds. Additionally, the response rate was substantially low. 
Therefore, these funds were excluded from this survey. 
2 The interviews were only conducted in Melbourne due to the resources limitations. 
  7
138 respondents. 6 respondents formally returned the questionnaire and declined to 
participate in this survey, resulting in an effective sample of 132. It must also be 
noted that no evidence is available to show that these 132 fund managers had agreed 
to participate in this survey. While, only 30 fund managers responded to the survey, 
equating to an overall response rate of approximately 23%.  
 
A non-response analyse was conducted in order to examine the presence of non-
response bias in this study and determine whether the findings based on the responses 
of these 30 respondents can be generalised to the population3. A followed-up 
approach of non-response analysis was employed in this study in which a reminder 
was sent to the non-respondents. As highlighted by Rogelberg and Stanton (2007), the 
collected information and data from followed-up respondents can be used to compare 
with the responses from early respondents on actual survey topic variables. This is a 
meaningful procedure in order to deal with the non-response bias.  
 
The test was conducted and no considerable difference was found by comparing the 
responses from early respondents and follow up-respondents samples. Indeed, the 
results exhibit that only one survey topic variable/question (heard about downside 
risk before this survey) from both samples is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
No similar result is evident for other variables, suggesting that the absence of non-
response bias in this survey is demonstrated and this 23% response rate can be used to 
generalise to the population.4 Thereafter, the analyses are conducted based on the 
responses from the 30 respondents. Firstly, the profile of 30 respondents is exhibited 
in figure 1. 
  
 
(Insert Figure 1) 
 
 
In general, most of the respondents were attached to an LPT. It is followed by 
Unlisted Property Trusts, Wholesale Property Funds, Property Securities Funds and 
Property Syndicates. This is quite consistent with the organisational breakdown of the 
Australian property funds industry, which is largely dominated by LPTs.  
 
 
(Insert Figure 2) 
 
 
Almost 83% of respondents have a benchmark for their funds where a range of 
benchmarks were employed by respondents. Figure 2 compares the benchmarks that 
are employed by Australian property funds. The S&P/ASX 200 Property Trust Index 
appears as the most often used benchmark for Australian property funds. In addition, 
the S&P/ASX 300 Property Index, S&P/ASX 200 Property Accumulation Index, 
                                                 
3 Werner et al. (2007) show that the non-response analyses are reported in almost 1/3 of the survey 
studies that are published in nine management journals (Tiers 1, 2 and 3).  
4 The results are shown in the appendix I 
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MERCER property fund index and Consumer Price Index (CPI) plus a specific target 
rate are also commonly used indices. Finally, the S&P/ASX 200 and S&P/ASX 300 
Property Accumulation Index are the least common indices, although not all of these 
funds are required to outperform the benchmark with only 63% of them are required 
to outperform the benchmark. On the other hand, 37% of the respondents do not have 
any obligation to outperform the benchmark. In other words, only about 60% of 
property fund managers could be remunerated with a performance fee.    
 
Surprisingly, almost half of the respondents do not have any specific risk measure. 
Nevertheless, this does not indicate that risk management is irrelevant for these funds. 
Many respondents pointed out that although no explicit risk measure is employed, the 
funds have also attempted to minimise their investment risk via some property/ 
project specific measures such as monte carlo simulation, scenario analysis and stress 
analysis. It is also believed that these measures could provide more reliable risk 
measurement. The specific risk measures that are employed by the property funds are 
presented in figure 3. 
 
(Insert Figure 3) 
 
 
Figure 3 presents the risk measures that are employed by most property funds. It is 
clear that the standard deviation (SD) appears as the most common risk measure; it is 
followed by beta, tracking error and risk-adjusted ratio. These results are consistent 
with the results from previous survey of US private investors and US business 
executives (Evans, 2004, Mao, 1970). This confirms that SD and variance framework 
risk measures are widely used risk measure among practitioners. Alternative risk 
measures such as downside risk and value at risk (VaR) are relatively seldom used 
risk measures among property investors.   
 
 
4.2 Risk Perceptions  
 
The previous section confirmed that variance and variance-related risk measures are 
the commonly used risk measures while downside risk usage is relatively uncommon. 
Does this indicate that variance and variance-related risk measures are more 
consistent with property investors’ risk perceptions? In this section, the perceptions of 
Australian property fund managers towards risk are surveyed and investigated. 
 
Property fund managers were asked a series of questions in order to examine their 
perceptions towards risk. Firstly, the property fund managers were given a 
hypothetical situation in which they were asked to assume that the benchmark return 
for their funds is 8%.  Then, they were asked to respond whether they would concern 
if the performance of their fund fell below the target rate. Finally, they were asked 
whether they would worry if the performance of their funds rose above the target rate. 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results.  
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(Insert Table 2) 
 
 
In table 2, it can be observed that property fund managers tend to agree that downside 
losses are risks for their investments. The majority (80%) of the respondents agreed 
that they would be concerned if their funds failed to achieve the target rate. This 
indicates that most of the fund managers agree that the downside part is risky. This 
result also confirms the previous empirical findings by Ang et al. (2006), Cheng 
(2005) and Lee et al. (2007a) in which downside beta is priced by investors. The 
results also provide a possible explanation to why downside beta is priced, which is 
documented by extensive empirical studies. However, almost 17% of respondents 
would not worry if their fund performance fell below the target rate. 
 
 
(Insert Table 3) 
 
 
Table 3 exhibits the results of fund managers’ perceptions towards upside potential. 
Overall almost 63% of respondents would not worry if their funds outperform the 
target rate. As interviewees stated: 
 
“WHY worry? Higher should be better. I signed the contract… bonus will only be 
given if I can outperform” (Personal Interview, May 2007)  
 
“I would be more concerned if the performance is too low from the benchmark 
rather than too high” (Personal Interview, June 2007) 
 
In other words, upside variability is irrelevant for the property fund managers in 
estimating risk. Apparently, this indicates that investors do not necessarily require a 
risk premium for upside variability. This strong negative response on upside 
variability also offers some explanation to why no evidence is evident by empirical 
studies to show that upside beta is priced.  
 
However, approximately 30% of respondents hold the view that outperforming 
variability is a form of risk where this is most likely due to the demand to meet the 
expectations of investors. Some fund managers have a conservative or balanced 
investment strategy. A long-term stable and consistent performance is essential for 
them in order to meet the expectations of their fund investors. Some interviewees 
explained that  
 
“I am worried if I perform too well in a year (say 20%) because if next year 
my performance is only 12%, which is still higher than my target (8%), my 
investors will be disappointed. I don’t want my investors to feel upset with my 
performance in the next year.” (Personal Interview, May 2007) 
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“How do we ensure that over a period of time, we continuously move on 
(improve)...in a risky environment, you need to be consistent with your 
forecast.”  (Personal Interview, May 2007) 
 
In other words, these fund managers expect the performance of their funds to be 
consistent with their expectations. Therefore, extreme volatility is undesirable 
regardless of whether it is downside volatility or upside volatility. This signifies that 
even though downside risk is the only risk priced by the majority of property fund 
managers, there is no evidence to show downside risk is a perfect risk measure for all 
investors.  
 
Interestingly, table 2 highlights that nearly 17% of all investors in the survey do not 
consider that the uncertainty of not achieving the target rate measures risk is a form of 
risk. Using the ‘Benchmark’ variable could perhaps be a valid explanation for this 
circumstance in which those respondents who do not have a benchmark for their 
organisation might not able to appreciate the underlying concept for the question. 
This can be demonstrated by the cross-tabulation in table 4.  
  
 
(Insert Table 4) 
 
 
Respondents without a benchmark tend to be less concerned with downside 
variability in which 60% of them selected ‘no’. More importantly, the chi-squared 
statistic is statistically significant at 5% level. The contingency coefficient and 
Cramer’s V both are also statistically significant at 5% which suggest that those 
respondents with and those respondents without a benchmark generally will give 
different answers. Thus, being unable to appreciate the underlying concept for the 
question is a reasonable explanation for this circumstance.  
 
 
(Insert Table 5) 
 
 
Conversely, table 5 shows that a benchmark does not have a far-reaching impact on 
respondents’ opinions for upside potential. The insignificant chi-squared statistic, 
contingency coefficient and Cramer’s V statistic show that the baseline results in 
table 3 are independent from the benchmark. In other words, there is no relationship 
between the respondents’ perceptions towards upside variability and the benchmark.   
 
Overall, the results indicate that a premium is required by investors for downside risk, 
while there is little evidence to support the view that investor need compensation for 
upside potential. This can also be used to explain why the empirical evidence clearly 
shows that downside beta is statistically significant. On the other hand, similar 
evidence does not exist for upside beta. This confirms that downside risk is an 
efficient risk measure because it is more consistent with investors’ behaviour, where 
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this finding has been supported both empirically and qualitatively in that investors are 
more concerned about downside losses than the upside gains.    
 
 
4.3 Understanding of Downside Risk 
 
The previous section has demonstrated that downside risk is more consistent with 
how investors individually perceive risk. The results show that the investors are more 
concerned about underperforming rather than outperforming the benchmark. In this 
section the awareness of downside risk among property fund managers is also 
examined. One of the advantages of downside risk is that it is able to accommodate 
different risk tolerance levels of investors since the assumption that all investors have 
similar risk aversion levels, is debatable. Table 6 reveals that almost all respondents 
disagree with this argument.  
 
 
(Insert Table 6) 
 
 
Almost 93% of property investors either disagree or strongly disagree that all 
investors have similar risk aversion levels, in that different investors should have 
different risk tolerance level. This disputes the assumptions of mean variance analysis 
in which the utility function for all investors is in quadratic form. The results are 
similar to the analytical evidence from Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) in which 
quadratic utility function assumptions cannot precisely explain actual investor 
behavioural. This also provides further support for the use of downside risk, where it 
has been demonstrated by Nawrocki (1999) and Sing and Ong (2000) that different 
risk tolerance levels of investors can be accommodated by using downside risk.     
 
 
(Insert Table 7) 
 
 
Table 7 shows the importance of investors’ risk aversion in estimating risk, with more 
than 90% of respondents agreeing that investors’ risk aversion should be considered 
in estimating risk. However, 6.7% of respondents disagree with this statement with 
one explanation being that they do not believe that any risk measure can successfully 
incorporate this element. This scenario is clearly demonstrated in table 8. 
 
 
(Insert Table 8) 
  
 
Table 8 presents the average ratings for the importance of two risk measures in 
accommodating investors’ risk aversion. The average ratings for both risk measures 
are around 2.6 where there is no substantial difference when comparing both risk 
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measures. This indicates that in general most property investors do not agree that 
these risk measures (i.e. downside risk and variance) can accommodate investors’ risk 
aversion. This implies that more study or endeavour is required to demonstrate the 
theoretical superiorities of downside risk which in turn will increase the awareness of 
property investors. 
  
There is another motivation for using downside risk as it does not require a normality 
assumption for return distributions. Hence, respondents were asked for their opinions 
on return distributions; in particular, are return distributions normally distributed? 
Table 9 exhibits the perceptions of property investors towards return distributions.  
 
 
(Insert Table 9) 
 
 
In response to this question only approximately 30% of respondents either disagree 
(16.7%) or strongly disagree (13.3%) that return distributions are normally 
distributed. In contrast, almost 47% of respondents agree and 6.7% respondents 
strongly agree with this statement. The strong agreement for this statement is 
inconsistent with the empirical evidence that has been documented by other 
researchers (Myer and Webb, 1993, 1994). The response from one of the interviewees 
could be a possible explanation for the divergence.  
 
“No.  It can’t be (normal). In fact, it is very very hard to be normal. In my 
experience, it is skewed... So, I am saying from practical term; I don’t think it 
is very normal. But, I will still use normal assumption and normal 
distribution. Otherwise, I am not going to finish…” (Personal Interview, June 
2007) 
 
This confirms that many fund managers do not agree that real estate return 
distributions are normally distributed. However, many fund managers commonly use 
investment theories such as mean-variance analysis and CAPM which restrict 
analysis to the first two-moment assumption. In other words, the property fund 
managers have to use the normal assumption and assume that the real estate return 
distributions are normally distributed when doing their analyses, although they do not 
totally agree with this assumption.  
 
There is another concern about the understanding of downside risk among 
respondents with and without a specified risk measure where the responses from these 
two groups could be different. Kruskal-wallies test was performed in order to 
examine the differences among the responses from these groups of respondents. The 
results are displayed in table 10. 
 
 
(Insert Table 10) 
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Table 10 exhibits the differences in term of the responses from these groups of 
respondents to the understanding of downside risk. No substantial difference is 
observed by comparing the responses from these groups. The only exception is ‘the 
agreement of all investors have similar risk aversion level’ where the chi-square 
statistic is statistically significant at the 5% level. The respondents with a specified 
risk measure tend to “strong disagree” with the statement of all investors have similar 
risk aversion level, whereas the respondents without a specified risk measure would 
prone to “disagree” with this statement rather than “strong disagree”.  In short, no 
evidence is presented to support that there is a difference between these two groups of 
respondents on the understanding of downside risk. 
 
In summary it appears that most property investors are not conversant with the 
theoretical superiorities of downside risk. Even though the limitations of variance are 
acknowledged by these property investors, they do not believe that downside risk 
measure can resolve these limitations. In other words, the theoretical assertions for 
downside risk are not accepted by practitioners. This supports the belief that more 
empirical tests on downside risk should be conducted and disseminated in order to 
increase the awareness of property fund managers towards downside risk.  
 
 
4.4 Downside Risk Employment 
 
The previous section has clearly showed the understanding and awareness of 
downside risk among property fund managers is relatively low. In this section the use 
of downside risk by Australian property funds is examined. In particular, respondents 
were asked for the reasons for employing and/or not employing downside risk. 
 
 
(Insert Figure 4) 
 
 
Figure 4 highlights the proportion of respondents who employ downside risk. 
According to the survey, 73% of respondents do not use downside risk; conversely 
27% of respondents do utilise downside risk. This is inconsistent with the findings 
from figure 3 where only 4% of respondents employ downside risk. The explanations 
from some interviewees are that even though no formal downside risk measure is 
employed in estimating the downside risk of their investments, several informal ways 
to minimise downside risk are employed by Australian property fund managers. For 
example, sensitivity analysis and scenario analysis are employed in order to forecast 
the worst scenario for their investments. Some funds utilise the firm-specific 
characteristics such as gearing, management structure, quality of asset, size and 
liquidity variables in order to minimise the downside risk of their investments. Lee et 
al. (2007b) previously demonstrated that these variables have some relationships with 
downside systematic risk. Interestingly, this also implies that some fund managers are 
not fully understood about downside risk. 
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(Insert Figure 5) 
 
 
The 27% respondents who employed downside risk were asked to answer why they 
use the downside risk. The results are depicted in figure 5 where it shows that 
“suitable with the risk management plan” as the key motivation for many property 
fund managers to employ downside risk. However, its recognition as “a superior risk 
measure” and “it is ease and convenience of use” are reasons put forward by some 
property funds. Some property funds use it for cross-checking purposes. This 
confirms that property fund managers view that minimising the downside risk of their 
investments is essential where taking steps to minimise downside risk is consistent 
with the risk management of their funds.  
 
 
(Insert Table 11) 
 
 
Table 11 highlights the reasons for not using downside risk measure among property 
investors who do not use downside risk (73%). The most common reason is 
“unfamiliarity of downside risk” in which many property fund managers prefer to 
employ popular risk measures such as variance rather than unpopular risk measures. 
A large proportion of investors cited other significant factors for not employing 
downside risk including “not suitable with their risk management plan” and “lack of 
awareness with its theoretical superiorities”. Other reasons that were pointed out by 
respondents are “it is not required by clients” and “no reason to use it”. In other 
words, they cannot see any economic benefits for using it. 
 
Interestingly, no respondent agree that the intractability and complexity of downside 
risk measure are causes for impeding them from employing downside risk. This 
indicates that even though fund managers are more comfortable with the traditional 
risk measures, it does not mean that they are reluctant to accept new risk measures 
such as downside risk measure due to the complexity of the measures. Nevertheless, 
lack of familiarity could be the main reason for resistance among property fund 
managers to the downside risk measures. 
 
 
(Insert Figure 6) 
 
 
This group of respondent was also asked to response whether they would consider the 
use of downside risk measure in the future. As depicted in figure 6, generally, many 
(45%) of respondents are unsure whether or not they will employ downside risk 
measures in the future. Among them, 23% of respondents clearly indicated that they 
do not have any intention of utilising it in the future. In contrast, the future 
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employment of downside risk is only applicable to approximately one third of 
respondents. It must be noted that its future employment is subject to the significance 
of its economic meaning. It is most succinctly voiced by one interviewee:  
 
“if… in the future, I am requested by my clients to show them the downside 
risk of their investments…then, I will  have to use it.” (Personal Interview, 
May 2007) 
 
In other words, the lukewarm attention of investors to the downside risk of their 
investments has undermined its economic value. It should be noted that the recent US 
sub-prime mortgage crisis and the collapse of several property funds in Australia 
could create awareness by investors to the importance of measuring the downside risk 
of their investments. 
  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The attractiveness of downside risk has been demonstrated by extensive empirical 
and analytical studies. Importantly, these studies confirm that downside risk is the 
only applicable risk for investors. However, there is a growing concern on there could 
be a gap between practice and theoretical assertions. This paper attempts to fill in the 
gap by examining the perceptions of property fund managers towards risk.  
 
There are several important findings from this study. First, variance-framework risk 
measures are the popular risk measures among property fund managers. Second, 
downside losses emerge as the only risk for most property investors where this can be 
used to explain why downside beta is priced. Generally, property fund managers 
require a risk premium for downside losses, although in direct contrast there is no 
evidence to show they require compensation for upside potential. This provides 
further support for the empirical evidence in prior studies where investors are more 
concerned with the downside volatility rather than upside. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that there is no empirical support for upside beta as well as beta in which 
beta measures both upside and downside volatilities.  
 
Third, the results appear that there is a disparity between theory and practice. 
Although fund managers agree that downside losses are risks for their investment, 
they are more concerned with the economic meanings of employing downside risk. In 
other words, the theoretical assertions about downside risk from the empirical and 
analytical analyses are not accepted by property investors. Additionally, the 
understanding or awareness of downside risk among the Australian property fund 
managers is still relatively low.  
 
The implications from the paper are that sustain efforts from researchers and 
educators in promoting and demonstrating the advantages of downside risk are crucial 
where downside risk is a favourable risk measure which is consistent with how 
investors individually perceive risk. Moreover, extreme high upside variability 
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appears to be applicable risk measure for some property fund managers. Therefore, 
researchers could contribute towards modifying the downside risk measure in order to 
make it more generally applicable for all practitioners. Given the recent US sub-prime 
mortgage crisis, a survey of property mortgage funds on the issue of downside risk 
materialises as a rapidly growing and essential future research direction.  
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Table 1: Asset Class Performance Analysis: December 2006 (Annualised Return) 
Market 1Y 3Y 5Y 10Y 
Share (ASX All Ordinaries) 24.97% (2) 24.51% (2) 15.50% (2) 13.11% (2) 
Direct Property (Australian 
Composite Property)* 
17.29% (3) 14.48% (3) 12.96% (3) 11.68% (3) 
LPTs (S&P/ASX LPT 300) 34.05% (1) 25.93% (1) 19.43% (1) 16.07% (1) 
Bonds (CBA Bond: All Series, All 
Maturities) 
  2.46% (4)  6.07% (4)  5.60% (4)  6.33% (4) 
Source: IPD/PCA (2007)  
Note: Parenthesis shows the rank and (*) Australian Composite Property return is represented by the 
IPD/Property Council Investment Performance Index. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Organisation 
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Figure 2: Benchmark of the Organisation 
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Figure 3: Employed Risk Measures by Property Funds 
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Table 2: Investors’ Perceptions towards Downside Risk 
Response Worry Performance Below Target Rate 
Yes 80.0% 
No 16.7% 
Unsure 3.3% 
Total 100% 
 
 
Table 3: Investors’ Perceptions towards Upside Potential 
Response Worry Performance Above Target Rate 
Yes 30.0% 
No 63.3% 
Unsure 6.7% 
Total 100% 
 
 
Table 4: Cross-Tabulation between Investors’ Perceptions toward Downside 
Risk and the Benchmark 
Response With 
Benchmark 
Without 
Benchmark 
Total 
Yes 73.3% 6.7% 80.0% 
No 6.7% 10.0% 16.7% 
Unsure 3.3% 0%   3.3% 
Total 83.3% 16.7% 100% 
Chi-squared statistic-8.160* 
Contingency Coefficient-0.462* 
Cramer’s V-0.522*   
Note: * indicates significance at 5% level; ** indicates significance at 1% level 
 
Table 5: Cross-Tabulation between Investors’ Perceptions toward Upside 
Potential and the Benchmark 
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Response With 
Benchmark 
Without 
Benchmark 
Total 
Yes 30.0% 0% 30.0% 
No 46.7% 16.7% 63.3% 
Unsure 6.7% 0% 6.7% 
Total 83.3% 16.7% 100% 
Chi-squared statistic-3.474 
Contingency Coefficient-0.322 
Cramer’s V-0.340   
Note: * indicates significance at 5% level; ** indicates significance at 1% level 
 
Table 6: Similar Risk Aversion Level 
Response The Importance of Risk Aversion 
Strongly Agree 0% 
Agree 0% 
Unsure 6.7% 
Disagree 33.3% 
Strongly Disagree 60% 
Total 100% 
 
Table 7: The Importance of Risk Aversion in Estimating Risk 
Response The Importance of Risk Aversion 
Strongly Agree 66.7% 
Agree 26.7% 
Unsure 0% 
Disagree 6.7% 
Strongly Disagree 0% 
Total 100% 
 
Table 8: The Importance of Risk Measures in Accommodating Investors’ Risk 
Aversion  
Risk Average Rating 
Variance 2.633 
Downside Risk 2.600 
 
Table 9: Return Distributions are Normally Distributed 
Response Return Distributions are Normally Distributed 
Strongly Agree 6.7% 
Agree 46.7% 
Unsure 16.7% 
Disagree 16.7% 
Strongly Disagree 13.3% 
Total 100% 
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Table 10: Differences between the Respondents on the Understanding of 
Downside Risk 
Responses Chi-Square 
All investors have similar risk aversion 5.303* 
The importance of risk aversion 0.906 
Variance and risk aversion 2.415 
Downside risk and risk aversion 0.382 
Normal distribution assumption 0.664 
Note: The test was performed by Kruskal-Wallis test. * indicates significance at 5% level; ** indicates 
significance at 1% level 
 
 
Figure 4: Downside Risk Employment 
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Figure 5: Key Motivations for Employing Downside Risk 
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Table 11: Reasons for Not Utilising Downside Risk 
Reasons Percentage 
Not suitable with their risk management plan 27.3% 
Lack of awareness with its theoretical 
superiorities 
18.2% 
Unfamiliarity of downside risk 36.4% 
Complexity of downside risk   0.0% 
Others 18.2% 
Total 100% 
 
 
Figure 6: Future Downside Risk Employment 
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Appendix I: Non-response Analysis 
 
Early Respondents (Wave 1) and Non-
respondents (Wave 2) 
Variables 
Wave 1 
(n=18) 
Wave 2 
(n=12) 
Mean 
Difference 
P-value 
Organisation 2.778 2.583 0.194 0.789 
Outperforming benchmark 1.500 1.167 0.333 0.067 
Standard deviation 0.278 0.167 0.111 0.498 
Beta/CAPM 0.278 0.083 0.194 0.205 
Tracking error 0.111 0.250 -0.139 0.334 
Downside risk 0.000 0.083 -0.083 0.227 
Risk-adjusted ratio 0.167 0.000 0.167 0.146 
VaR 0.000 0.083 -0.083 0.227 
No explicitly risk measure 0.556 0.417 0.139 0.473 
Others 0.000 0.083 -0.083 0.227 
Heard about downside risk 1.278 1.000 0.278 0.047* 
Worry below target rate 1.222 1.250 -0.028 0.885 
Worry above target rate 1.778 1.750 0.028 0.898 
Similar risk aversion level 1.556 1.333 0.222 0.352 
Importance of risk aversion 4.556 4.500 0.056 0.859 
Variance and risk aversion 2.556 2.750 -0.194 0.622 
Downside risk and risk aversion 2.389 2.917 -0.523 0.176 
Normal distribution 3.222 3.083 0.139 0.763 
Downside risk is more sensible 3.056 3.583 -0.527 0.087 
Downside risk employment 1.833 1.583 0.250 0.136 
Employing downside risk 3.333 3.400 -0.067 0.960 
Not employing downside risk 2.333 3.287 -0.953 0.141 
Downside risk future 
employment 
2.000 2.423 -0.429 0.303 
Note: * significance at 5% level, ** significance at 1% level.  
